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Andrew Atkeson opened the discussion by noting that the model me-
chanically violates Gibrat’s law. In the model, large firms lose workers
proportionally to the stock of workers but attract new workers only at a
constant absolute rate. In this way, he said, the model produces differ-
ential wage‐setting behavior in small and large firms. Atkeson pointed
out that this will mechanically run afoul of Gibrat’s law, and even
though he does not necessarily believe in Gibrat’s law, he would want
a mechanical theory of firm dynamics that has the potential to be con-
sistent with it. Moscarini responded by noting that if a Gibrat’s law re-
gression were taken over the averages of the business cycle, one would
get a close to zero correlation between firm size and firm growth as
Gibrat’s law predicts. Since growth is negatively correlated with size
earlier in the business cycle and positively correlated later, the average
correlation would be close to zero. He also pointed out that the intuition
of why large firms behave differently than small ones is richer than the
basic mechanics outlined by Atkeson. In particular, the basic objective
function of the firms is supermodular in productivity and wages. A big-
ger firm will have larger incentives to retain workers since each worker
is valuable. A more productive firm will also have larger incentives to
retain workers because of constant returns to scale combined with
higher‐value workers. Thus, bigger firms will offer higher wages, even
in the case of firms that are homogeneous in productivity.
Robert Shimer then pointed out that another mechanism in the model
to make large firms get larger is that the authors assume that larger and
more productive firms actually attract workers at a faster rate than
smaller firms. Moscarini responded with a comment that this is a rea-
sonable assumption that would be achieved in a standard model with
convex vacancy costs. Higher‐productivity (and thus higher‐profit)
firms that face convex costs for posting vacancies will choose to post
© 2009 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. All rights reserved.
978‐0‐226‐00204‐0/2009/2008‐0104$10.00more vacancies than lower‐productivity firms. They will therefore at-
tract workers at a faster rate.
Michael Woodford brought up the role of the back‐loading of wages.
A feature of Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay's model is that wage commit-
ments are reset for everyone after a shock occurs. Without restriction to
constant wage offers, this feature ends up allowing the back‐loading of
wages. Woodford pointed out that there could still be back‐loading in a
slightly altered, and perhaps more reasonable, model. Specifically, as-
sume that a commitment of a wage path is made for an individual
when first hired that will last for as long as that particular employment
relation stays. Then back‐loading could still exist without the feature
that everyone’s wage path was reset at the same time. Woodford won-
dered whether the assumption that these wages are reset for everyone
is a critical element of the way the model works. Moscarini said that
the back‐loading the authors have in their model is at the establishment
level; things would certainly change if the assumption that all workers
are paid the same were relaxed. However, he believed that the back‐
loading at the establishment level is critical to the labor movements
in the paper. When unemployment is high, the workers are coming
for free; but when unemployment declines, the firms need to raise the
shadow value of the wages of older workers. Once large firms do this,
the small firms respond. He pointed out that, in this model, smooth
wage back‐loading is achieved without risk aversion, thus producing
a different notion of back‐loading than in standard search models.
Olivier Blanchard asked if there might be other reasons that small
and large firms are different. He would have thought that small firms
often work for large firms; for example, if the last recession was largely
caused by shifts in demand initially to the large firms, then it would
seem that large firms would be affected before small firms mechani-
cally. If there were a relatively reliable lag structure such as this one,
it would be important to take it into account when looking at the facts.
Moscarini mentioned an empirical fact not addressed in the paper,
which is that in recessions larger firms tend to take bigger hits. If both
firms worked together, he would expect to see more comovement. This
fact made him skeptical of the story that small firms are related to large
firms in this way.
Daron Acemoglu began a discussion of the overall relevance of this
paper in the business cycle literature. He wondered what the right set of
first‐ordereconomicissuesweretothinkaboutwhenstudyingemployer‐
to‐employer (EE) labor flows. From a labor economics perspective, it
seemsthattheinterestingissuesmightlieinthecareersofyoungworkers.
Discussion 74Most young workers in the U.S. labor market change a lot of jobs, and
there is evidence that these are productive changes. It might be more
generally true that young workers are learning about what jobs they
are good at and what types of employers they will get along with as
they transition from job to job. Perhaps one way of reading these facts
is that business cycles are either interfering or facilitating this realloca-
tion of workers toward tasks in which they are more efficient. Moscarini
agreed that this might be a relevant issue. However, he pointed out that
it is not obvious that the learning issues that Acemoglu brought up are
related to firm size, so he thought it is possible that the learning aspect
of EE transitions is an issue orthogonal to those discussed in the paper.
Susanto Basu followed up with an open‐ended question about how
one should think about the cyclical behavior of the labor market differ-
ently depending on how the issues are resolved between the authors
and the discussants. Moscarini’s recommendation was to use the share
of employment of large firms as one of the variables in structural vector
autoregressions, since this variable is a good predictor of wage growth.
This model provides a story for why this would be. Shimer, however,
highlighted the potential for understanding the cost of business cycles,
since a feature of this model is that business cycles reduce the realloca-
tion of workers to where they should be.
Finally, Robert Hall noted that, when thinking of EE transitions, what
matters in this model is whether the worker retains the option of stay-
ing in the current job. There is a separate distinction between whether a
worker has quit or been laid off, and the quit numbers in the Current
Population Survey (CPS) include layoffs to some degree, since many
people know ahead of time that they will be laid off and then head di-
rectly to a new job. In fact, in a number of studies, about a half of people
in mass layoffs immediately move to new jobs. Given this, Hall won-
dered whether there was any connection between the CPS measure of
transitions and the conceptually correct one that Moscarini had identi-
fied. Moscarini thought that, if anything, this incorrect CPS measure
would mechanically dampen the volatility of measured EE transitions
and thus might explain the perceived small volatility in the data.
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